Stratos ID
Identity provider and passkey infrastructure for 3,000 SaaS products.
Held by Peregrine, released automatically on resolution. Covers 17 critical payouts at top of band.
- critical$30k – $120k
- high$10k – $30k
- medium$2,500 – $10k
- low$500 – $2,500
Bands are floors and ceilings the program is held to. Mediation can move a report within a band, never below the floor of its agreed severity.
| Asset | Type | Max severity | Eligible | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *.stratos.id | web | critical | yes | Hosted login, admin, dashboard |
| api.stratos.id | api | critical | yes | Management and OIDC endpoints |
| github.com/stratos-id/* | source | critical | yes | All public SDKs |
| Passkey relying-party service | infrastructure | critical | yes | WebAuthn verification |
- Account takeover that requires the victim's password
- Phishing-only scenarios
Any authentication bypass that yields a session for an account the researcher does not control is Critical and paid at the top of band. Signature-handling findings in SAML or JWT are prioritised for same-day triage.
- criticalPGN-10482
SAML assertion accepted after signature element is relocated under a wrapped Response
A second Assertion placed before the signed one was processed by the relying-party parser while the signature check ran against the original. Proof used two researcher tenants.
$96,000Resolved - criticalPGN-10428
Passkey ceremony accepts attestation for a different relying-party id under a wildcard origin
rpIdHash was compared against a wildcard-expanded set that included a sibling subdomain the researcher controlled.
$70,000Resolved - highPGN-10330
OIDC back-channel logout token accepted without aud check across tenants
A logout token minted for tenant A terminated sessions in tenant B. Both tenants were researcher-owned.
$25,000Resolved
- 1@saltmarsh$96k1 resolved
- 2@ilse$70k1 resolved
- 3@nullwave$25k1 resolved